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The Releases: An Assessment 
In past issues of the Bulletin, we have reported Jn detail the 
release plan announced feveml years ago by KOPKAM11B, 
the Army"' Security Command in charge of political im-
prisonment, and have followed as closely as possible the im· 
plementatlon of thia plan. 
The following statement summarises our Q!Se:mnent 0 I the 
plan and its implementation to date and enumerates the ob· 
jecti~!J which need to be pursued. 
The lndonesian Government's release plan, announced in December 
1976, which promised the 'release or trial' of all political pri&oncrs 
(the so-called G30S/PKI detainees arrested in connectiOn with the 
1965 events) by the end of 1979, represents a marked improvement 
in the political prlsoner situation in Indonesia. But coming as it did 
at a time of growing worldwide concern about human rights vio-
lations which, in Indonesia's case, could materially affect its chances 
of o btainl.ng desper.itely needed military and economic aid from the 
West, it i~ clearly an attemp11o_mollify international criticisms 
while at the same 11me.dist1acting attention from other grave human 
rights Violations, notably the atrocities being perpetrated by Indo· 
nesian troops in East Timor and West lrian as well as the repress.ion 
of present-day opponents of government policies. 
It should be stressed moreover that since the government has now 
conceded that all tapols with the exception of those in the A-<:ate-
gory (those awaiting trial) arc to be released, it is inexcusable for the 
government to keep them in detention any longer. Most of them 
have already spent nearly 13 years in detention without trial. 
The release plan pledged the release of just under 30,000 B-cate-
gory prisonen phased over three years: l{),000 in 1977, I 0,000 in 
1978 and "the rest" in 1979. B-category prisoners are those defined 
as persons "known to be guilty" of involvement in the 1965 events 
but regarding whom there is insufficient evidence for a trial. Until 
· the announcement of the new policy, they were designated as being 
too dangerous to release. 
On 20 December 1977, KOPKAMTIB announced the release of 
10,000 tapols. In July this year, it announced that the 10,000 re-
leases scheduled for 1978 would be phased. On 20 May, the rel.ease 
of 265 tapols was announced In Bandung, West Java, and on 26 July 
a further 3,921 releases were reported to have taken place in a 
number of regions throughout· the country. The remaining 6 ,000 
tapols due for release this yc;u reportedly include 4,000 from Buru, 
Correction 
The last T APOL Bulletin issued in June 197 8 was incorrectly nun1· 
bered as No 27. We apologise for any confusion this may have 
caused. 
and will be rete·ascd In two further stages, 2,000 in Octot>er and 
4 ,000 in December. 
For an assessment of the significance of these 1eleases and the 
reliability of the government's promises. we need to examine several 
a,~pects: 
I. Numbers: 1 t is crucial ttl aslle!ls the accuracy of overall govern· 
mcnt figures, on the basis of which its promise to release aU B-cate· 
gory tapols stands or falls . No independent sources in Indonesia arc 
prcpaied to accept the government'~ total figure which stood at 
19,791 for all categories after the December releases." 
There are several reasons why sources in Indonesia believe that 
the actual f"igure is very much higher than the government's official 
figure : 
-KOPKAMTIB figures for the oftidally-acknowlcdgcd places 
of detention are in many cases known to be below the actual 
number of detainees in these places; 
-KOPKAMTIB administration and statistics :u:c notoriously 
unreliable and probably exclude a number of places of de-
tention (breakdowns of figures arc always given in terms or 
regions, not places of detention); 
- a considerable number of detainees arc being held in non-
fonnal places of detention, working for military offices or es· 
tabllshmenn 01 for individual officers, and are simply not 
/r;onrmued on pag~ 1} 
"In June, 1978, KOPKAMTIB's Chief-<1f·Staff, General Yoga 
Sugama ga.ve a new figure of 20,127, but did not explain why the 
figure had inc1eased. Since 265 tapols had been released in the pre-
vious month, the total figure should have gone down . 
TAPOL's New Address 
Pleue note that all correspondence with TAPOL should now be 
addre~ to our new addre~. as rouowa: 
8a Treport Street, 
London SWl8 2Bf. 
'Tapol' is an Indonesian contraction for 'tahanan 
politik' meaning political prisoner. It is still widely 
used although it was banned in 1974. because the 
military authorities said that all prisoners are 
'criminals'. 
accounted for in the official statistics. 
For these reasons, official figUres ue known to be very incom· 
plete. T APOL believe$ therefore that tens of thousands of tapols an: 
unaccounted for in the official figurel!_. 
2. Actual Numbers Released: On the basis of impressions received 
from various sources In Indonesia, it would appear that the actual 
number released in December 1977, including those transferred 
(forcibly or otherwise) to "resettlement ateH" did approach 10,000. 
However, in the absence of a public list of released prisoners with 
clearly identifiable addresses, there is no way to check the accuracy 
of KOPKAMTIB'& announcement. We are not yet in a position to 
comment on the reliability of reports that 4,186 tapols have been 
released so far thls year. 
KOPKAMTIB justifies its refusal to publish lists of released 
prisoners on the grounds that this would make them easily jdentl-
fiable and therefore vulnerable to victimisation by hostile elements. 
But it is KOPKAMTIB itself which, by means of special regulations 
and discriminatory practices including marked identity cards, 
ensures that released prisoners are clearly distinguhh.able. This con-
cern to conceal the identity of prisonen is therefore hypocritical. 
There is, in additi-On, information being received that new arrests 
continue to take place. It appears, for example, that many persons 
who left their homes in 1965 to escape the killings or to avoid arrest 
have recently returned home under the impress.ion that the change 
in policy towards tapols will have reduced the risk of arrest, only to 
discover that this is not so. 
3. Transfer to Resettlement ~ntres~ When the release plan was first 
announced, KOPKAMTJB also announced the establishment of 
labour camps. Initially, the~ were referred to as "'transmigration 
centres" but KOPXAMTIB terminology now seems to have changed, 
in favour of pemukiman or resettlement areas, emphasising 
apparently that these places should not be seen as part of the trans-
migration programme <Jesigned to reduce population pressures in 
Java and Bali. The Burn Island labour camp, set up in 1969, is the 
prototype for these camps. The official justification for tJansferring 
released prisoners to these centres was that they might encounter 
difficulties in finding wo1k. · . 
There was immedia1e international criticism of these plans, as a 
result of which implementation of compulsory transfer& was con· 
siderably scaled down at the time of the December 1977 releases. 
Another reason why fewer transfers than anticipated occuned at 
that time may have been that some of the sites designated for re-
leased prisoners were not yet ready. From various sour~ in 
Indonesia it is now known that several hundred tapob said to have 
been released were forcibly· transferred to such placu becawe they 
had been classified a& "diehards" by KOPKAMTIB psychotests. An 
even larger number are said to have "volunteered .. for transfer; it is 
likely that altogether nearly one thousand 'teleased' tapok were sent 
to these centres following the December 1977 releaJCS. 
KOPKAMTIB clearly intends to ensure that a much larger per-
centage of ta pol& released in 197 8 go to these camps. This ls appar· 
ent from statements made by lCOPKAMTIB officials in June and 
July this year. (We ref et our readers ~o a detailed account of these 
statements in the it.em on page 4 reporting on the 1978 teJeases.) 
As A mneny .International said in a Press Release usued on 28 
July, J978: "The government should also imm~tely ce&lle its 
practice of forcibly sending some released detainees to rese~~ent 
camps in isolated areas of Kalimantan, Sumatra and Sulawesi. 
The conditions under which "released" prisonen are held in 
these reM!ttlement areas are the subject of continuing investigation 
and were spotlighted by the ILO at its 64th Session in Geneva this 
year when it had under consideration Indonesia's continuing vio-
lation of ILO Convention No. 29 outlawing forced labou1. (~ p8 
of this Bulletin.) It is futile for JWPKAMTIB to give aMUrances that 
transfers are voluntary . The people in question have spent many 
years in detention, subjected to innumerable pressures. They can 
easily be prevailed upon by their military captors to acoept Mililtions 
that they would find unacceptable if given free and unfettered 
choice. Under the present arrangements, some thousands at lcut of 
"released" tapols will find themselves in resettlement areas, sub-
stantially still detainees, working on government labow projects. 
Kompar, 27 July 1978 published this photo with a caption that read in part as follows: 
Bandung's Gelora Hall was charged with emotion ~ 715 8-<:ategory GJOS/PKJ detainees were rdused yesterday. Ex Army officer, Tatuig 
Roaedi"ardendy hugs his wife. He has had to wait 12. years ror this moment. His wire, R.oekmini is like a gem that he lost but found again. 
•'She went out of my lire for a while and lived with another man to try to alleviate her own sufferings while l was in detention,'"' said Tatang. 
The story of hls wife's emotional conflict and or his own tribulations after slw left him are recounted in a novel entitled Roekmini Yong 
Kemhali (Roe.kmini Who Returned), written while he wns in prison, 
(Facilities for writing are not genenlly granted to political prisoners. Xompas does not explain whether the novel was written without 
official knowledge or with the help or special privileges granted to thls prisoner.) 
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4. The Buru Camp: TI1i~ camp remains the prototype of forced 
labour camps for political prisoners in Indonesia. Af1er the release 
of 1.500 tapoh from there In 1977. the total number remaining was 
officially said tel be 10,152. To this figu1e must be added at least a 
thousand wives and children now living there with tapals, whose 
status is basically the same a& the prisoners. Although KOPKAMTlB 
has announced that 4,000 more will be released this year, General 
Yoga Sugama's statement, reported in our item on page 4, suggests 
that a considerable number of these may be prevailed upon to re· 
main on the island, living at the special resettlement area now said 
to have been set up there. In addition, it is known that prisoners 
who have their families with them and prisoners who get married to 
girls now living there with their families are required to give an 
undertaking never to leave Bum. · · 
It ls therefore certain that several thousand persons at least will 
remain at the Buru camp after the release plan has been completed. 
5. Released Prisoners Now at Home: The circumstaricei of prisoners 
who have returned home arc very grave. As a result of numerous 
official restrictions and a variety of discriminatory practices, they 
are encountering many economic and social pn1blem..~. These can be 
!'>ummarised as follows: 
a. Only a tiny fraction have found jobs. This is probab1y well 
below 5 percent. Ex-prisoners are excluded from all govern· 
ment job\ and from "vital ent~rpriscs" (defined at the dis-
cretion of local military omcers). Private "non-vital" 
companies arc afraid of employing ex-prisoners becau~e they 
are required to report all such appointments to the military 
a uthoritics. 
b. Ex-prisoners wishing to travel or to move to another 
district mu3t obtain permission from the military. 
c. Ex-prisoners are not allowed to take part in local elections 
either as candidates or as voters. 
d. They continue to be under close official scrutiny and, with 
virtually no chance of finding jobs, they are particularly vul· 
nerable to pressures to work on government project$ for little 
ot no pay. Sevezal examples of this have recently come to 
light. (See article on page 9.) · 
e. Ex-prisoners are frequently held responsible for local dis· 
orders and are defenceless against such allegations. 
f, They cannot exercise their right to claim back properties 
~ized before or after their arrest; in many cases, this involves 
properties such as land and equipment that arc of productive 
value. . 
To sum up, released prisoners are being deprived of many civil 
rights, which greatly compounds their rehabili1lltion and re·adjust· 
ment problems. There is the danger, moreover, that the problems 
they encounter could be used by KOPKAMTIB to persuade other 
tapols now due for release to "volunteer" for the labour camps. The 
~tatemen1s made in June and July by General Yoga Sugama and 
Admiral Sudomo appear to substantiate this. 
n1e restoration of full dvil rights for all released tapols is there· 
fore essential not only to alleviate the circumstances of those al-
ready at home but also to remove the basis for official pressures on 
those now scheduled for release to opt for tran~fer to resettlement 
areas. 
6 . A-category Prisoners: Jn official terminology, these are the 
prisoners awaiting trial When the release plan was announced, it was 
also announced that all trials of A-category prisoners would be corn· 
pleted by the end of l 978. Thereafter, any untried A-categotY 
prisoners would be re-classified into the B category and treated 
accordingly. 
Per!IOns who have been tried and convicted (tota111ng 904 accord· 
ing to a Government document issued in JanuatY 1978, although 
KOPKAMTIB officials still seem to prefer the figure of "about 
800") are t:xcludcd from the aggregate figures of "G30S/PK1 prison-
ers" announced fIX11n time to time by KOPKAMTIB. A new term is 
now being used for these prisoners; they are called "nadapol", a 
contraction of naTtJpida11a polilik or politit:al. convicts. The govern-
ment·~ claim that there will be no more political prisoners after the 
end of 1979 totally ignnrcs the fact that at least a tht1usand 
nadapols will st.ill be servin~ long sentences (including life sentences 
and a number of death sentences not yet executed) for "'involve-
ment" in the 1965 events. . 
AU trials are heavily biased against the defendant : the courts lack 
impartiality, defendants &Je denied the most elementary rights and 
facilities, and almost all are brought to trial many years after their 
arrest. 
Conclusions: Although the release plan has brought about a marked 
improvement in the political prio;oner situation in Indonesia , it is 
totally inadequate ln a number of respects. The objectives wltlch 
need to be punued by human r.igh ts campaigners with regard to 
Indonesia's 1965 prisoners can be enumerated as follows : 
J. The immediate, unconditional release of all untried political 
detainees. 
2. The CC!ltOration of (ull civil rights to released prisoners, particuJ· 
arty with regard to jobs. 
3. The immediate closure of all resettlement/labour camps set up for 
released prisoners, and the relene of :Lil. persons now at these places. 
4. The immediate closure of Buru Camp and the removal of all re-
strictions on the freedom of movement of all prisoners and members 
of their familk~ now there. 
S. An immediate amnesty f'or all persons who have been tried a.nd 
convicted of political offences. 
6. The granting of facilities to completely independent bodies to 
umlcrtakc relier work aimed at securing the speediest possible re· 
habilitation or all released prisoners. 
At the ~me time it is c~scntial to u<>css the lndoncsiai; Govern· 
mcnr's current human rights record in the light -not <Jnly of its 
policy toward~ the "G30S/PKI prisoners" hut also nfit~ human 
right~ violations in East Timor, in West !Tian and elsewhere, as well 
as its widespread suppression of dissent an11>ng l\foslem groups, 
students, intellectuals and artists and its suppression of press 
freedom. 
Tapol ·France 
A TAPOL Committee for the Defence of Political Prisoners in Indo-
nesia has been set up in France. 
In an inaugural press release ili&u.cd in Paris on 30 June last , the 
Committee lists its objectives as being: 
-to disseminate information about Indonesia's political prison-
ers, about their conditions and about violations of human rights; 
- to organise meetings, discussions and exhibitions ; 
- to send or to participate in legal, medical and humanitarian 
mis~ions; 
- to make public t11c needs of the prisoners and their families, 
and eventually to respond 10 these needs, particularly in the 
form of financial solidarity and the collection of funds. 
The Committee's address is: 68, rue de Babylonc, 75007 Patis. 
CHRONOLOGY 
of 
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN INDONESIA 
FROM JUNE 1976 TO MAY 1978. 
This 28 page book wa~ issued by TAPOL on the oci:as!on of 
this year's IGGI Meeting. [t details violations in all fields of 
human rights, from impri~onment to censorship, from the 
banning of films and songs to atrocitie~ in East Timor. 
Place your orders with TAPOL. 
Price: £1.00 plus postage: 20 pence (UK) 
50 pence {Europe) · 
£ 1.00 (ove~eas,ai.rmail) 
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More Releases Reported 
On 26 July last, KOPKAMTlB announced the release of 4,186 
B-category political det&inees. They are .the first of the ta pols to be 
released in 1978, for which year KOPKAMTIB has promised total 
releases of 10,000. 
This first phase occurred in two groups: 265 were released in 
Bandung, Wes1 Java on 20 May and 3,921 were relea!ed in a number 
of places throughout the country on 26 July or so.on after. It has 
not yet been possi'ble to verify independently that this number of 
tapols was actually freed. 
The remaining 6,000 ta pols scheduled for release this year are .re· 
portedly going to be released in two further phases: 2,000 In 
October and 4 ,000 in December. KOPKAMTIB had prcviotUly 
announced that the 1978 releases would include 4,000 tapols from 
the i$land of Buru. It is likely therefore that the group released in 
December will be the Buru tapols. 
Agricultural Resettlement .. 1 ntensified •• 
In a statement on 4 July, KOPKAMTIB'~ Commander-Jn-Chief, 
Admiral Sudomo said that "efforts to resettle (the released tapols) 
in agricultural areas that had already been made ready would be in-
tensified" and that "al>out 300 detainees had already registered to 
stay in resettlement centres in Kalimantan" (Kompa~. S July, 1978). 
In the same statement, Admiral Sudomo explain.ed tha1 releaSeS 
this year would be phased because "releasing them all simultaneous· 
ly causes too much trouble both in regulation and in superv:iskm". 
A month earlier, KOPKAMTIB's Chief.<lf.Staff, General Yoga 
Sugama had spoken of the need for "thoroughgoing preparations, 
particularly with regard to providing them with employment"'. He 
said that this problem would be particularly acute this year as no 
fewer than 4,000 of the total released would be from Buru, by com· 
parison with 1,500 last year. "Only 23 of those released from Bum 
last year," he said were willing to take advantage of the rellettlement 
areas located outside the Buru detention centre. 
"All the rest had returned home to Java and, according to an 
evaluation carried out by KOPKAMTIB, only very few had found 
employment." (Kompos, 8 June, 1978.) 
This is the first time rhat a KOPKAMTIB official has said that 
~omc tapols released in 1977 had opted to remain on Buru. None of 
the press reports canicd after the December 1977 releases, including 
·the many reports published by forejgn journalis1S, made any 
mention of thls. · 
It is also the first official reference to a "resettlement area made 
ready by the Government in Buru". General Yoga Sugama described 
this as an area of "1,400 hectares of wet riceland and 1,200 hectares 
of dry fields" which, he regretted, the released tapols .. had not 
taken advantage or'. 
Regional Breakdown of Recent Releases 
The following Is the regional breakdown of the releases that took 
place in July this year: 
Ac eh 
W. Sumatr,a/Riau 
N. Sumatra 
W. Kalimantan 
S. Sumatra 
Jakarta 
W. Java 
C. fava 
E. Java 
4 
106 
148 
44 
44 
i31 
715 
464 
954 
Nusatenggara 
E. Kalimantan 
S. and C. Kalimantan 
Maluku 
N. and C. Sulawesi 
S. and S.E. Sulawesi 
Nusakembangan 
Plan tung an 
Nirbaya 
S6 
9 
26 
11 
118 
22 
748 
117 
114 
The 265 persons released in West Java on 20 May came from se-
veral prisons in the province: 162 from Kebun Waru, Bandung, and 
the remainder from prisons in Cirebon, Serang and Bogor. Among 
those released from Xebun Waru Prison were the well-known painter, 
Hendra Gunawan, and the poet, A.S. Sidharta. Both have been in 
detention without trial fot ahnost 13 ycan. 
Dr Ina ~lamet, anthroPologist and Conner lecturer at the Univen-
ity of Indonesia, reading the pledge of loyalty just prior to her 
fonnalrelease at Nlrbaya Prison, Jakarta, on 26 July, 1978. Dr 
Sl21net, who is Dutch by birth, has lived in Indonesia &i.nce her 
marriage to an Indonesian in the 1950.. She was arrested in l 967. 
Her appearance at a release ceremony has raised queries about 
the composition of priaonen released on this occasion as Dr 
. S!amet is known to have been liiing at home already for a 
number of yean. (Photo rrom Kompas, 27 July, 1978.) 
More Confusion Over Official Figures 
ln a statement which was reported fn the press on S June, 1978, 
General Yoga Sugama gave a total r.1gure for remaining tapols of 
20,127, but on 26 July, during the main release ceremony which 
was held in Bandung, West Java, General Yoga Sugama said that the 
. total number of tapols after the July releases was 15,605, that is to 
SllY 19,791 (KOPl<AMTIB'sofflcial figure after the De.cember 1977 
release$) minus 4,186. It i$ not clear which figure General Yoga 
Sugama intends us to take se1iously, hls June total or his J\lly total. 
This is yet another example of the exllSpenting confusions caused 
by KOPKAMTIB itself in the official figures it uses. 
4 TAPOL Bulletin No 29 August 1978 
NO. 
WARPLANES 
FOR 
INDONESIA 
The campaign to halt the sale of eight Hawk ground attack/trainer 
aircraft by Britain to Indonesia continues to develop in the UK and 
has also resulted in protest actions in other countries. 
In the UlC, many Members of Parliament have continued to press 
the issue by asking the Government questions about the sale and 
writing to the Foreign Office. A large number of constituency 
Labour Party branches have adopted resolution$ opposing the sale, 
and have also written to the Government. This was acknowledged 
frumally in a reply given by Dr John Gilbert, a Minister at the 
Department of Defence, when he told Frank Allaun, MP on 25 July: 
The recent announcement by British Aerospace of the sale to 
Indonesia of eight Hawk trainer airciaft has prompted letters 
from MPs, members of the public, and constituency Labour 
parties, and questions have been tabled in the House. 
On 27 July, a group of MPs led by Mr Robin Cook met Frank 
Judd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
to register their concern at the sale. 
In Portugal, a letter of protest against the sale wu handed to the 
. British Embassy in Lisbon on 25 July. The letter was signed by no 
fewer than 1,800 East Timorese refugees now living in Portugal. The 
letter urged the British Government to reconsider the sale of these 
deadly aircraft which could be used to silence the voice of the East 
Timornsc people. The sale, said the letter, could tum Britain into an 
accomplice in genocide now taking place in fast Timor. 
In Australia, a three-hour picket took place outside the British 
Consulate in Adelaide on 26 May protesting against the sale of the 
Hawks. Over one thousand leaflets were distributed and a poster dis· 
play drew attention from passers-by. 
On the next day, the British Consul in Adelaide met a dclcitation 
from the South Australia Campaign for an Independent East Timor. 
He told them he could understand thelr concern over the East 
Timor situation which he described as "regrettable'' but claimed 
that the Hawk a.iscraft were not attack aircraft. 
Tapol Protest to British Government 
T APOL has protested strongly to the British Government for itJ de-
cision to cancel Indonesia's debts to the United Kingdom arising 
from past economic assistance to that country. 
The decision was taken Under a new policy entitled "retrospec· 
tive terms adjustment" which allows the cancellation of debts owed 
by the world's poorest countries, a definition applied according to 
the World Bank's estimate of countries whose annual per capita in· 
come is less than $280. 
When announcing the new policy in the House of Commons on 
31 July, the Minister for Overseas Development, Mrs Judith Hirt de· 
clared that retrospective tenns adjustment "will not be extended to 
countries which would otherwise qualify but which we regard as 
having seriously violated human rights". Bell.des Indonesia, sixteen 
countries will benefit from this policy. Three countries have been 
excluded on grounds of their human rights record: Cambodia, 
Uganda and South Yemen. 
In its letter to Mrs Hurt, T APOL stated among other things: 
"At the same time as awarding this major financial concessi<>n to 
Indonesia on the grounds of it qualifying as being among the poorest 
cowttrles In the world, the Government bas agiced 10 allow the we 
to. lndonesia of eight Hawk ground attack/trainer aircraft worth 
£25 million. This deal has aroused considerable protest within the 
Labour Party and in the (Labour Party's) NationaJ Executive Com· 
mittee itself on the grnunds of Indonesia's deplorable record of 
human rights violations. Moreover, it would suggest that lndonem 
should be deemed capable of repaying its debts if it is capable of 
purchasing advanced aircraft!' 
The amount of debt to be cancelled in the case of Indonesia may 
be a~ high as £43 million (a precise figure has not yet been made 
available by the Ministry for Overseas Development). The sum of 
£43.1 million was given as total British aid to Indonesia in tl1e 
period from 1966 to 1975, in a written reply to a Member of Parli· 
arnent on 7 May, 1976 by Reginald Prentice who was then Minister 
for Oveneas Development. Since that time, British aid to Indonesia 
has been supplied in the fonn of non-repayable grants. Altogether 
£15 million has been supplied in grant fonn, with another £3 
million having been committed by the British Government at the 
1978 meeting of the IGGI. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Students' White Book Available in English 
A full English translation of the White Book published by students 
of the Bandung Institute of Technology on 14 January this year as 
part of the students' campaign to oppose President Suharto's re· 
election has been published in the quarterly review,AMPO, Volume 
10, Nos 1·2, 1978, which is published by Pacific-Asia Resources 
Center. Readers wishing to have copies could write direct to PARC, 
P .0. Rox 5 250 Tokyo International, Japan for a copy of AMPO, or 
to TAPOL for a photocopy of the item which we can supply at a 
cost of 75 pence plus postage. 
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SUHARTO AND THE LATIEF 1
1 
by: Professor W. F: Wertheim , 
Translated from De Groene Amiterdammer, 19 July, 19 78 
It is already more than twelve years s.ince Lieutenant.Colonel 
Untung was brought to trial in Jakarta as leader of an attempted 
coup on the night of 30 Sep'tcmbcr and 1Octobe11965. In that 
action, six Army generals were kidnapped and assassinated; General 
Nasution managed to escape. This was done. according to lrntung 
and his associates, because they were members of a Council of 
Generals which had planned to overthrow President Sukarno. The 
coup d'etat, intended to thwart the plot of the generall!, failed and 
General Suharto, Commander ofKOSTRAD (Army Strategic 
Re&erves Command) succeeded in forcing the surrender of the re~ 
bellious officers in the course of 1 October. 
As .a result of these dramatic events, the political relations of 
power in Inaonesia were transformed at a stroke. The internal con-
tradictions within the Indonesian armed forces which came to the 
fore during the officers' coup were pushed into the background. The 
Communist Party (}f Indonesia (PKI) which had also played a role in 
these events tecelved full blame for the coup in a series of witch-
hunt trials and in the Army's propaganda. President Sukarno was 
also, on the grounds of his "involvement in the coup", shorn of his 
poweu and incarcerated by his succ~sor, Suharto, until his death. 
Two of the three main lead·ers of the coup, Lieut~ol. Untung and 
General Supaidjo, were sentenced t~ death and executed. But the 
third man, Colonel Latief, who was shot in the leg during his aJrest 
~as kept constantly in an isolation cell in Salemtia Prison in Jakarta 
without being brought to trial. 
Now, more than twl:lve years later, the trial of Latiefis at last 
taking place in Jakarta. And by contrast with 1966 when Indonesian 
newspapers were. filled with detailed reports of tlte Untang trial,, the 
Latief trial is being treated in a very cursory and diffidertt way. For 
this, as well as for the long po~tponement of the trial, there is. a 
reason. The fact is that this Latief trial is developing into an ex-
tremely painful affair for Suharto. 
Already shortly after the coup, quesrions were being asked 
about Suharto's role in the affair. lt w~• in itself remarkable that he 
was unhanned on that fateful night, although he had always, on 
gJounds of ~eniority, taken army commandex Yani's place duril'lg 
his absence, meaning that Suharto would logically have been the 
petSl.m to sptlfi.lt int<l action as soon as the coup which included the 
death of Yan!, one of the kidnapped and assassinated generals, be-
came known . At fint, tl1e rum<.1ut was spread that Suharto had aJso 
been on the list of generals to be kidnapped but that on the night he 
was away from home visiting his dukun (astrolo~) on the out-
skixts of Jakarta . This story proved to be incorrect. At the time 
when his colleagues were being kidnapped by Untung's squads, 
Suharto was at home. When he was woken by his neighbours after 
some shooting in the neighbourhood, he drove s1raight to his 
KOSTRAD headquarters on Merdeka Square. It was a remarkable 
fact that the military squads involved in the ooup ignored Suharto'! 
headquarters although the presidential palace and other strateiic 
buildings around the same ~uare such as the .radio station and the 
tckcommunications centre were occupied. And this notwithstanding 
the fact tl1at KOSTRAD pcssesscd its own short-wave communi-
cations system. Remarkable too was the efficient and purposeful 
way Suharto acted on 1 October in supptessing the coup, by con-
trast with the bungling of Untung. and his associates. Thus the quest-
ion soon cropped up whether.in thls instance the well-known rule of 
detective stories was not applicable: the likely criminal is the one 
who benefits the most from the crime. And In our case, this was 
certainly not the PKI but · .•. General Suharto. 
If tli.is is so, then one should also not speak any more about an 
ab<lftive coup. On the contrary, Suharto's plan to grasp powet was a 
phenomenal success, although this was achieved at the cost of much 
blood-letting: first the massacre of the generals and then the ma~ 
killings 'ofsupporters or alleged supporters of the PK!. 
In view of all this, it wa.s natural to examine whether there were 
any connections between Suharto and the leaders of the coup. And 
in fact there was evidence of such connections. Untung had se?Ved 
under Suharto's oommand and had distinguished himself in the 
struggle to wrest West Irian (West New Guinea) from Dutch control. 
In addition, Suharto attended Untung's wedding in a small town in 
Central Java Jn 1964. · . 
But in 1969 a brand-new bit of information came to light. From 
a book by the vehemently anti-communist, American journalist, 
Arnold Brackman, the following facts be~ known: .Suharto told 
him 'that Colonel Latief, Untung's closest associate daring the coup, 
' Suharto's plan to grasp power was a 
phenomenal success··.· ' · 
had, during the night in queation,just fow hours before the action 
of the squads to kidnap the gener.als. met him at the Military 
Hospital where his small son was being treated for bums following 
an accident with a bowl of hot soup. Shortly after his meeting with 
· Latief, at rnidrughl, Suharto went home .. 
This contact with one of the main culprits immediately before 
the decisive action was a strong indicatio.n that Suharto had had at 
least foreknowledge of the coming events. !Ns was all the more as-
nificant as it could be established that this contact took place in be-
tween two meetings of the plotters. On the basis of this contact, 
Suharto must certainly be considered as being .. tetlibat (involved) in 
the coup". and to a far greater degree than the tens of thousands of 
persons who were arrested all over the country simply for being left 
wing activist&, and who were forced to languish in dreadful concen-
tration camps an4 prisons on suspicion of being "terlibat in the 
<:oup". For tlte crux of the matter is this: if Suharto knew ot sus-
pected what was going to happen, why then did he not immediately 
warn his colleagues who were just about to be kidnapped? 
Su11arto's e1>1planation to Brackman was that latief had· met him 
in the hospital apparently in a show of friendship because of the 
accident suffered by Suharto's '°n but, in retrospect, Suharto had 
realised that latief was sent to the ho~pita1 on the otders of his 
assotiates to check whether Suharto was so preoccupied with his 
son's illness that he would not be in a state of mind to take mili-
taI)' action against their coup on the following day. This is a strange 
supposition in view of Suharto's reputation as an inveterate fighting 
gener.al. But then Suharto made things worse for himself by giving 
another exp)anation in an interview published in the German mag· 
azinc, Der Spiegel; that Liitief had C-Orne to the hospital to ass~sin­
ate him but had got cold feet at the decisive moment. · 
Just imagine! Latief, all alone, coming to the hospital at 11 
o'clock at.njght, four hours before the actual operation, to kill 
Suharto, thus raising the alaun and exposing the plan of the coup 
prematurely, and so thwarting its_ execution. The fact alone that 
'Suharto must certainly be considered 
as being ''terlibat (involved) in 
th . t e coup· · · 
Suharto tried so dislngcnuousJy and by every means to give 
"innocent" explanations of his meetillg with Latief at the military 
hospital, reports of which must have leaked out, made the whole 
affair !a:r more suspicious. 
Some time ago, I drew these facts togetller In an article, 
··Suharto and the Untung Coup: the Missing Llnk"(l). In it f wrote: 
"What was discmsed bet-ween the two will remain a mystery until 
Colonel Laticfis. able and prepared to talk." And now Latief has at 
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RIAL: A PAINFUL REVELATION 
last got the chanoe to present his version of that last-minute meeting 
with Suharto·. , 
On 12 1 uly, NRC-Handelsblad published an article about the 
Latief trial by Peter Schwnacher, which. was based on my analysis. 
Schumacher stated that, aeco.rdlng to lndones.ian press reports, 
Latief contended during his trial that two days before the C<Jup 
attempt he visited General Suharto and hii wife at their home. He 
made a request that they be called as witne3Ses to explam what the 
th1ec had discussed during that visit. This request was rejected by 
the Military Court. Schumacher wondered why Latief did not talk 
about the meeting at the hospital and did not say that Suharto knew 
about the coup plans. 
When Schumacher wrote his article, he could not have known 
that 1hc full text of laticf"s 60-page long statemen1 delivered in May 
(2) was circulating in Holland. It is clear from this document that 
Latief did riot mince words. He did In fact expose the active role of 
Suharto. in the coup plans. lie not only mentioned his vWt to 
Suharto'~ home two days before the coup but also dwelt at length 
on his visit to the Military Hospital on the eve of the coup wberc he 
met Suharto. Latief points out the ridiculous contradictions be-
tween the explanations given by Suharto conceming. the meeting 
in his interviews, and says: "The truth is that on that nJght I not 
only went to see his son who had had an accident but also reported 
that a movement would be launched on the following morning to 
prevent a coup d'etlt by the Council of Generals. which he aheady 
knew about beforehand." He had already talked about the plan~ of 
the Council of General.<> during his visit to Suharto's home. 
The reawn why Latief reported the plans to Suharto, which, he 
did in close consultation with the other two coup leaders, Untung 
and Supardjo, was conneeted with the intimate ties of friendship be-
tween his family and Suharto's family . latief describes these re-
' ' intimate ties of friendship· · · · · · · 
lations in great detail. They originated in the years of the revolution. 
In this context, Latfof says that history books on the struggle form· 
dependence have done him an inju.~ticc because the heroic attack 
against Dutch-Qccupicd Jogjakarta on 1st March 1949 wa.~ led not 
by Suharto but by him. While the attack was in progress, Suharto re-
mamed In the safety of his headquarters. 
But Latief also describes in detail the change in Suharto's 
attitude on the day after the meeting (in the hospital) when the 
latter suddenly turned against them (the cuup lt:aders). At:cording to 
Latief, the reason for this wu that Suharto's pc;Son;d ambit.ions had 
been offended when President Sukarno, who had to decide on a 
"caretaker" as a successor to Yani, assumed dead, appointed not 
Suharto but General Pranoto who came after Suharto in seniority. 
When someone mentioned Suharto as a candidate, the Presiden·t 
retorted: "He is s1ubborn." Subsequently . says Laticf, Suharto was 
to act against Sukarno in an absolutely disloyaJ and unlawful way. 
The President was accused of being "involved in the coup" be.ca~e 
of his presence at 1he Halim Air Rase where Untung and his asso- · 
ciatos were gathered, whereas Suharto, as is now apparent, was im-
pllcatcd in a far more substantial way ·on the grounds of his fore· 
knowledge alone. If he, Laticf, and his associates are hcld xespons· 
ihlc for the events, then Suharto should at the very least be h~d 
co-r~ponsible.bcc.ause of his failure to report to his superiors imme· 
diately about the coup plans. According to the rules of the Suhart-0 
regime itself, he would fall into Category A, the most serious cate-
gory of suspect~ held in connection with the 1965 coup. Laticf 
therefore believes that Suharto himself sh,;uld al~o be bro1J11:ht to 
trial . 
Why did Latiefrnakc a ~t;itemcnt that is so dam~ing to Suharto's 
position and lntcrcs,t~? ll was certainly not bcc:ause he hoped that 
by doing so be would be acquitted or receive a lighter sentcm:..-:. Thi~ 
would be quite unrealistic. Latief was apparently not afraid to face 
the j udge either. In his statement, he shazply rejected reports dis-
seminated at the time in the lndonesian press that he was tiyi.ng to 
evade a tnal by using his illness as a pretext. He ha$_ apparently been 
waiting all these years for the chance tc make public his accusation 
of betrayal against his former fr.iend, Suharto . 
Suharto's unwillingness to appear in court and deny Laticf"s 
statements means that the accusations that have been made will 
hang over his bead like the famous sword . The fact that Suharto was 
unable to prevent this trial at which Latief would open hb mouth 
and ~peak shows how weak his own position had become in the 
meantime. 
But meanwhile we in the Netherlands, and undoubtedly a number 
of well·informed people in Indonesia too, know who was an accom· 
plice in the massacre of the generW.s, and who, by playing a double 
game, got rid of all his rivals -- lint the generals including Nasution 
(although he escaped, he W8$ subsequently neutralised by Suharto), 
and finally also Sukarno. By playing this game, he was able to climb 
t o unp~cdented heights, so high that his steep fall is now undoubt· 
cdly near. · 
The prosecution has demanded a death sentence for C.aticf and it 
is likely tl1at the Military Court will pass ~uch a sentem.-e. But the 
cou1agcous way in which latief conducted his defence in addition 
to the fact that he. was not the one, as became 'evident during the 
trial, who issued the order to kill the six generals, gives u.~ reason to 
hope that he will be pardoned . . . by Suharto's successor. 
1. Published in Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol l, No. 2, Winter 
1970. The article is al~o included in a recently-published book by 
Professo1 Wertheim; Indonesia: Va11 Vorsteririfk Tor Neo·Kolottie, 
(Boom Publishers) . 
2. La liefs statcmen t , delivered on 5 May. 1978 was his excepsi or 
demurrer, a procedure permitted to the defence before actual hear· 
ings commence to challenge the jurisdiction of the court or legal 
aspects of the trial. 
Col. I.atiei, dlUing a court session, listening to a prosecution 
witness. 
LATIEF GETS LIFE SENTENCE 
Colonel Latier wn found guilty and sentenced to life im· 
prisonment by a Spedal Military Court on 1 August last. An 
important document 11ubmitted to the court, his excep~"i 01 
demurrer, which was presented at the hearing on S May, is 
now in our bands. We shall carry a fuller report of this and 
other upects or the trial .in the next i5Sue. 
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ILO . calls for prompt release 
of all tapols 
At its Sixty-Fourth session held in Geneva in June 19 78 the Inter-
national Labour Organisation called for the prompt release of all 
Indonesian political detainees without "le1al or moral pres.sure to 
participate in the transmigration scheme''. The ILO Committee on 
the Application of Conventions and Recommendations said that 
teleased prisoners should be able to "re'i!stablish themselves in the 
community freely and unconditionally'' and receive assistance from 
the government for "their reintegration into socic1y and employ-
ment". The Committee noted that "some progress had been made in 
the application by Indonesia of the Forced Labour Convention", 
but ''cxprc!.Scd concern that there was ~ome delay in the implement-
ation of the original plan for the: release of the detainees which the 
Government had announced to the Committee in previous years". 
The ItO committee also expressed the hope that "some form of 
international supervision of the release of the detainees" would be 
accepted by Indonesia, "so that public opinion as well as the (lLO) 
Committee of Experts ... could be satisfied that the Convention 
(on Forced Labour) was fully imple!'llented ... 
The Applications Ccmmit1ee gave particular attention to the 
nature of the Indonesfun government's transmigration progrdmme 
for the political prisoners. Trade Union members stressed that trans-
migration "should be Voluntary and not compulsory", and noted 
that the Indonesian government had promised thnt this would be 
the case. But, the trade unioni~h added, "the ILO Committee of 
Expert& •.• and sever.ii other international bodies wonder whether 
the progress promised will be fully achieved ... "They called for in-
dependent verification of Indonesian government promises regarding 
1he political prisone~. "since world public opinion is very 
concerned". 
Camp Regu1ations Requested 
The trade unionists also enquired into procedures by which re-
leased prisoners enter the transmigration facilities, and asked 
whether "impermissible pressures'; weic being applied on the prison-
ers to settle in these areas. The ErnployeN' members of the Appli-
cations Committee went further, repeating a previoU8 request of the 
Committee of Experts for .. copies of the regulations concem.ing par-
ticipation in the resettlement projects". They also a5ked whether it 
was "really possible" for ex-prisoners •'to withdraw frnm a Tesettle-
ment project by a simple notification and return freely to the 
(prisoner's) place of origin once having left the resettlement areas?" 
Tr-ade Union members of the Committee raised additional 
questions concerning the employment opportunities of released 
prisoners. they noted that former prisoners face severe discrimin-
ation .. in that former employers do not dare to re~ngage former de-
tainees". They called for an end to this and other kinds <Jf discrim-
ination faced by ex-prisoners, and requested that "the promises 
made by the Indonesian government be fully carried out, and that 
clarifications and precise replies be provided to the doubts expressed 
on the international level, for fastance through verification of the 
situation by external parties such as international groups or experts". 
The trade union representative of Sweden also called for the 
Indonesian government to acccpt "the supervision of an inter-
national body" over the release of the political prisoners. He a.lllo 
asked the Indonesian government to "publish the names of those 
persons liberated as well as those not yet liberated", and noted that 
other sources had higher estimates of the number ofprisom:rs still 
detained tltan that of the official government figure. 
the 1rue meaning of the term "unconditional freedom .. , as defined 
by the Jndonesian government. The Dutch trade unionist asked 
pointedly if the Indonesian government was taking all necessary 
measures "to end the stigma" under which released prisoners were 
living. The Indone.sian government spokesman only cited photo· 
graphs of prisoners being released from Bwu island, claiming that 
this was evidence that released prisoners enjoy "unconditional 
freedom ... On the question of ending the stigma, the government 
spokesman stated that the former detainees were fre.e to work in the 
public sector and in any other industry they so choose-a claim con-
tradicted by repeated official statements. (See, for exl\f7lple, the 
interview with KOPKAMTIB Chief-of-Staff Admiral Sudomo, 
Tempo, 24 December, 1977, published in TAPOL BuUetin, No. 26, 
February 1978.) 
The Dutch trade representative went on to ask the Indonesian 
government spokesman to specify the kind of help it waJ providing 
ex-prisoners in the area of employment. There was no response 19 
this point. He also asked whether the government was taking any · 
initiatives to help ex-prisoners who ~id not wish to join resettlement 
areas: "If so, in what way'!" queried the Dutch unionist_ And, the 
Dutch unionist added "What happens when the released detamees 
arc too old or too s.ick to work7" The Indonesian govem.ment 
spokesman replied that released prisoners may reauume their 
pension rights, a statement contradicted by all available evidence 
(~cc story on page 9). There was no reply, however, to the question; 
of what initiatives the government is taking to help those who do 
not want to transmigrate. 
·--~,---
SWEAT BOXES FOR PRISONERS IN W. [RIAN 
A report in the Melbo11rn~ daily, The Age, dated 22 May, said that 
Indonesian authorities held 30 West lrianes.e pmonen in steel 
"sweat boxe$" for three months. 
The Age reported that the prisoners, who .. possibly" were 
members of the Free ·Papua Movement (OPM), we.re "allegedly 
beaten before being locked in steel cargo containers, with no light 
or ventilation, near 1he Freeport Copper mine in central west 
lrian Jaya," A European who had travelled extensively in lrian Jaya 
over the past two year~ was the source of the reports. The European 
said that he ha.d 0 personally seen" the oompound where the people 
were jailed in the containers measuring 7 metres by llii me1res by 
2Y.i 1netres. The prisoners, said the European, had all been .. savagely 
heaten", and after being held for three months, "disappeared." 
The European uid that in addition to having seen the "sweat 
box.cs", he had also witnessed the shooting of unanned lrianese and 
the bombing of several villages by Indonesian places. The bombings 
and other actions were said to have been in retaliation for the 
sabotage of a copper ore pipeline by OPM guerillas. Aft.er the pipe-
line incident, the man said, Indonesian soldiers launched "search 
and kill" operations in the area, "indiscriminately shooting people". 
"End the Stiama'' 
-e In order to solve these problems, it is essential to restore full civil 
Further questioning of the lndonesian government position came rights to ex-tapola and to eliminate all restrictions and discrim-
from the trade union representative of the Netherland~. concerning ination .which totally violate fundamental human rights. 
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The lot of an ex·tapol 
The following ariicle wcs written by an t:X·tapol released ill 
December 1977 who i1 now ltving in Ja~•a. 
The unrest in Indonesian society which i$ becoming incrca.&ingly 
complex cannot be resolved by Suharto's military neo-fasdst 
government. This uruest is the inevitable reSl.llt of the social and 
governmental system that now exists. AU manner of policies, activ· 
ities or statements by those in power not only fail to end this unrest 
but only show just how quickly it is intensifying. This was very 
clearly reflected by the Secretary-General of the Council for 
National Defence and Security, Lieutenant-General f.1.M.R . 
Kartakusum.ah when he said , speaking before a meeting of Commit· 
!!ion t of the Indonesian Parliament on 16 June last, that: 
"In order to overcome unrest in society and provide a guarantee 
for national resilience, it Is necessary to establish a basis of power 
that includes equal opportunities for all in economic and ~ocial 
affairs, the distribution of welfare and sovereignty of the people." 
This statement only confirms that there are several elements of 
the problem which have not yet been resolved: 
1. Unrest exists in Indonesian sodety and the Government has not 
yet been able to resolve it . 
2. It has not yet provided a guarantee for national resilience. 
3. Equal opportunities have not yet been granted to all . 
4 . The economic sector ha~ until now been dominated by an indi· 
vidual or a group of people. and its fruits have not only not been 
distributed but have been conc:entra1ed in the hands of those who 
are in power. 
S. The statement and the sugge~tions made by Gen. Kartakusumah 
come only from an individual, they are not government proposals. 
Even though the statement was made by a general who is Secretary· 
General of the National Defenc.e Council, it only reflects the 
opinions of an individual and not the general attitude of those in 
power. 
The social unrest desciibed by Lieut-Gen. Kartakusuma.h is c~· 
pecially keenly felt by ex·tapol.s. They experience social, political. 
economic and other forms of d.iscrimination. Restrictions and dis-
criminatory measure~ are created by the authorities from the very 
first day of their release. On the day they are released, they are 
ordered to sign a twelve-point declarlltion whiCh includes the 
following : 
-ex·tapols may not take part in political activities or spread com-
munist or Marxist·Leninist views, 
-they may not become employees of the State or .the army, 
- they must accept all the past actions of the Government and the 
Kopkaintib, 
- they must be ready at all times to be summoned and interrogated 
by Kopkamtib. 
Although Admiral Sudomo, the Chief-of.Staff of Kopkamtib bas 
said that society must be willing to acc:ept back the ex-tapols, tJ:te 
Government's own restrictions and discriminatory measures turn 
Sudomo's words into empty phrases with little meaning in practice. 
Restrictions and Discrimination 
Besides all this, many unwritten restrictions and discriminations 
exist, such as: 
-when an ex·tapol wants to travel anywhere, he must apply for per-
mission and obtain a special letter from the local military authority 
(Kora mil), 
- when he moves, he must apply for and obtain permission from the 
district military authority (Kodim), 
- If he gets a job, his employer must report to the local authorities, 
-ex·tapols are obliged to report themselves once a week for two 
month~ and must at the same time undergo indoctrination. 
A released person naturally wants to take part in the same act-
ivities as other free people, especially in seeking a livelihood . But as 
a r~sult of government restrictions, employers are reluctant to take 
them on and use a variety of reasons to tum them down; they just 
tell them to wait to be called, and so on. In additkm, the system of 
requiring a letter of non-involvement in the G3-0S/ PKI and sub-
mitting a personal history means that an employer will know that 
the person in question is an ex·tapol with the result that the chances 
of working in the private sector are closed to them. E\"e11 if they are 
taken on by a company, they face discrimination in promotion. 
even in perfectly straightforward things like being granted perma· 
nent status or becoming head of a section. 
Another example of discrimination concerns those ex·tapoh who 
were formerly employed in mili1ary or civilian departments. Those 
who had worked long enough to be eligible for a pension but who 
had not completed the necessary arrangements because of tlte G30S/ 
PIO now find, after their release, that their pensions are being held 
up. Every time an ex-tapol approaches the authorities about such 
matters, he gets an evasive answer such as: "There arc no instruct· 
ions from our superiors. Please wait till we have heard". 
Confiscated Property Cannot be Restored 
As for private p1opcrty seized by the authorities from 1965 to 
1967, it i~ not possjbie to have this property restored despite verbal 
assurances that this will be done. The properties confiscated or 
grabbed by individuals included such things as houses, furniture, 
cars, wet and dry rice-fields, !lshponds, bicycles and radios_ The 
failure to return this property makes it difficult for ex-tapols to 
cope with their basic daily needs. The things seized include means of 
production like land, rice-fields, houses and vehicles which could be 
used to earn a Jiving . 
Ex·tapols 1i ving in villages fed the effect of political restrictions 
particularly strongly : In elections for village chief, for village g:overn· 
mentor eouncHs they have neither the right to vote or to be elected. 
In one kecamaton (sub-<iistri.ct) in East Java , Kedungpring in the 
kabupaten (district) of Lamongan , there arc no fewer than 2,000 ex-
tapols and ex-members of left wing political and ma.ss organhation~ 
who do not have lhe right to vote. They only have the right to 
work. About 400 ex·tapols from Buru and Nusakembangan in the 
kebupaten of Rojonegoro in East Java were ordered to work on the 
construction of a tobacco factory 0~11cd by the K.retek cigarette 
company, "Gudang Caram", from february until April 1978 in the 
village of Waru, and they were paid only Rp. 300 (about 35 pence) 
a day. In addition, ex·tapols arc also the object oflabour mobilh· 
ation for "service" (kerja·bakti) projects, such as road repairs or 
construction village government buildings. They are also required 
to pay a levy of Rp. 1,000 towards each development project. 
Tho~c who have lost their houses. and gardens and no longer have 
families arc forced to lodge in other people's homes and take what· 
ever they can get in order to be able to live. 
The mental pressures arc equally severe. Ex·tapols and ex-
members of left wing organisations are s1ill under surveillance by the 
authorities both in the countryside and in the towns. If anything 
happens, especially in the villages, they are always the ones who the 
authorities turn against first . 
Civil Rights Must be Restored 
These, then arc tltc consequences of the restrictive and discrim· 
inatory practices employed against eJt·1apols and ex-members of left 
wing organisations. Such restrictions affect no fewer than about one 
million people, applying as they do also to the families of these 
people. As a rcrult of such restrictions, these people are forced to do 
any kind of work just in order to survive, at below minimum 
standards. People who have degrees in l.ii.w, economics, literature and 
other subjects arc compelled to work as coolies at the docks, as 
labourers on ~uilding sites or become casual office workers. As for 
those who previously had no qualifications, many have no·w becorne 
trishaw drivers, street vendou, black-market ticket sellers, or drivers' 
companions.. 
continued on opposite page ""'"' 
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TRIALS 
SAWlTO GETS EIGHT YEARS 
Mr Sawito Kartowibowo, the man held responsible for the so-<.-alled 
letter plot which came to light in September 1976, has been found 
guilty and sentenced to eight years. He has also been ordered to pay 
co!!ts. His sentence is to be reduced by the two years already spent in 
dctenti-On (he w·as arrested on 14 September, 1976) . 
· When· Sawito told the court he would appeal against the verdict 
and declared, "I reject your verdict", spectators hi the public gallery 
applauded loudly, cheering, "Long Live Sawito!" 
The prmccution had demanded 20 years. The proSt.'Culor slated 
after sentence had be.en passed that he would consider whether to 
appeal. (By Indonesian law, prosecution can appeal against sentence 
if it i~ considered too light.) 
The trial which had dragged on fot one whole year came to an 
end on 1 August 1978. 
Passing sentence, the pre~iding-judgc declared that Sawito had 
been found guilty of trying to undermine the government's authori-
ty and 1;ausing unrest in society. fie had persuaded other person.~ to 
believe that lie was the appointed "King of JusticeH and had played 
Ll1c key role in all meetings leading to the drafting of five documents. 
At these mce tinKS, Sawito had consi.~tently blamed President 
Suharto for all society's ills. The document entitled, "Surrender of 
Powers" had been designed to imitate the 11 March 1966 surrender 
of powers document on the basis of which President Sttkarno had 
handed full powers to General Suharto, now the country's Prnsi.· . 
dent, the court (leciared. 
In an earlier hearing, Sawito in his defence pica acc:u.sed the 
court of deliberately withold.ing documents of crudal importance 
to his defence. 'fhese documents had been confiscated from his 
home at the: time of his arrest. His demand that these documents be 
returned to him for formal presentation to court had been ignored. 
The subsequent verdict spc<.ified that all documents of evidence 
were t<> be kept by the.~late. 
Sawito also bitterly comph1ined of the court's refusal to call wit-
nes~es whom he had requested, including Indonesia's former Vicc-
President and eluer statesman. Moh. Hatta, and religious dignitaries 
who had signed documents for which Sawito was being held res-
ponsible. 
Throughout the trial, hearings were attended by large crowds 
whu displayctl strong sympathy for the defendant . 
Dr AIDIT TO BE TRIED 
Dr Tanti Aidit, the widow of D. N. Aidit. the late chainnan of the 
Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), will be brought to trial soon 
after spending over l 1 years in detention, according to a July 8 
statement from the prosecution office in Jakarta. Mrs A.idit. a med· 
ical doctor, has been under detention since 1967. She \\-ill be 
charged with "complicity in the G30SJPKI affair. 
Dr Aitlit was born in Central Java. Her father was a deset:ndant 
of Kartini, who was known for her writings on women's emanci-
pation at the beginning of this century. Or Aidit married in the late 
t 940s, then studied medicine in Jogjakarta, graduated in 1957, and 
became a lecturer in histology at the Univerdty oflndonosia in 
Jakarta. She also worked at the Central J fospital in Jakarta and ran 
a medical clinic for the left v.ing women·~ organi~at.ion, Gerwani 
(banned in 1965). . 
After the events of October l, 1965, Dr rudit went into hiding 
to avoid arrest, but was eventually detained in 1967. Although her 
hur.baod was killed in 1965, she has still not been officially informed 
of his death . 
Since her arrest, Tanti Aidit has be.en isolated from other pri.,on· 
en. Although other political detainees who a:rc medical doctors have 
been allowed to practice in prison, Dr Aidit has been barred from 
similar activity. She herselfsuffers from a serious heart condition, 
but was only taken to a hospital for examination in 1971, after four 
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Mr Sawito Kartowibono was geeted enthusiastically by crowds 
u he left the court-room after being sentenced to eight years im· 
prisonment on charges of attempting to overthrow President 
Suharto. (Photo from Kompas, 17 July, 1978.) 
* * * 
. years during which hc1 health was neglected by the prison authori-
ties. Mrs Aidit's mother, Mrs Mudigdio, who was a Member of Parlia-
ment fo1 the PKI until 1965, was also a poli ticaJ detainee at the 
same prison for nearly 12 years, but the daughter's isolation status 
made it virtually impossible for them to meet. 
Although Dr Aidit had 11>tIOng fie~ with tbe left wing movement 
in her own right-in particular as a memberofGcrwani-the main 
reason for her arrest and for the unusuaUy harsh treatment she h:is 
received in prison is her identity as the widow or the chairman of 
t~e PKI. 
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Rendra still in prison 
RENDRA AND THE CENSORS, 
W. S. Rendra, who remains in prilon ajthout charges or trial, still 
appears to be veJY much a matter of concern to the Indonesian mili-
tary authoti~ According 10 Tempo (24 June, 197&}, Minister of 
Information General Ali Murtopo appeared recently before the 
Indonesian Parliament to clarify the status of the hitherto baJ)Jled 
fDm, Thi: Young in Love, which features Rendra in the leading role. 
(See TAPOl bulletin No. 28, June 1978.) 
What rust caused problems for the rtlm, said General Murtopo, 
was "director Syurnan Dyaya's interpretcition of the Script" wltich 
"introduced an element of politics wmch could be considered to 
bring a negative influence to bear on society." Another problem, 
however, was Rendra's prominence in the film. "The introduction 
of a political element was emphasised by the choice of Rendra as 
leading actor", MurtoP.o said. 
Murtopo added that KOPKAMTIB had banned the film "on the 
assumption that th.e film had already been thrown out by the cellS<lr· 
ship board." This, Murtopo said, was a wrong assumption, as the 
censors .. did their job on 15 April 1978," with the result "that the 
fiJm could be released for 17..year-olds upwards u long as all scenes 
and dialogue of a political nature were cut as it was believM they 
could affect law and order." In General Murtopo's view, the it1m 
.. wasn't cut too much" since even after the ccnso:rs had cut "600 
metres", the mm "still nms for 2 hours 28 minutes" which is long 
enough fot any Indonesian fllm. 
It was still unclear, however, if the public would see the film. 
According to Tempo, that awaited instructions from KOPKAMTIB. 
UK GOVT WANTS RENDRA TRIED OR FREED 
IMMEDIATELY 
In a letter replying to enquiries made by Member of Parliament 
Hugh Jenkins about the fa.te ofW. S. Rend1a, 1he Indonesian poet 
and playwrlghtimprisonedin May thh year, Lo1d Coronwy-Roberts. 
Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office stated 
the hope that Rcndra would be "brought to trial without delay, or 
that, if charges against him cannot be sub~1antiated, he will be re· 
leased as soon as possible". 
Lord Goronwy·Roberu ~id of Rendra that "he has long been an 
outspoken critic of the Indonesian government, which has previous-
ly allowed him t() express his criticisms in his plays". (This ovcdooks 
the fact that military authCJrities in ~ome parts of the country have 
banned his works on a number of occasions.) 
The Foreign Office letter about Rendra was the subject of a 
question in Parliament on 26 July. Jn reply to a question whether 
the Government would publish this letter expressing the view that 
Rendra should immediately be tried or released, the Undet..secret· 
ary of State for Foreign Affairs; Mr Evan Luard said that it wouJd 
not, but that Mr Jenkins was at liberty to publish it if he so wished. 
PEN-USA Calls for Rendra's Release 
American PEN sent the following ~ble io President SuhartCl on 25 
July: 
I 700 writen of American PEN defending the right to free ex-
pllsti<>n, distressed over two-month detention ofpoer W.S. Rendra. 
Urge his release without delay. Signed, Richard Howard, President 
fEN America11 Center. 
TESTIMONY OF 1967 
W. S. Rendra 
The world we are building is an iron world 
of glass and howling holes. 
Tomorrow's world is no longer virginal 
but mined and open to all 
like some liberated slut. 
The dreams we chase are dreams of shining platinum. 
The world we walk in is a world of poverty. 
The situation which imprisons us is the gaping jaw of a jackal. 
Our fate flies like a cloud 
opposing and mocking us, 
becoming mist in the sleep of night 
and sun in the work of day. 
We shall die in the middle of our fate 
with hands arrogant and clenched. 
Hands which rebel and labour 
Hands which tear at the sacred envelope 
unfold the holy letter 
written in difficult characters which we cannot read. 
PEN-JAPAN ADOPTS PRAMUDY A AND RIV Al APIN AS 
HONORARY MEMBERS 
Japan's PEN-Club has decided to canter honorary membership on 
two imprisoned Indonesian writers, Pramocdya Ananta 'foer and 
Rival Apin. The decision was taken at the Club's Board meeting on 
15 July. Others conferred this honour were Atexandet Gimberg, the 
Soviet dissident who has just been sentenced to 8 years, the im-
prisoned Malaysian poet Said Zahari, and writers from Singap<m 
and Kenya. 
The system of conferring honorary membership was devised as a 
way of expressing support to writers who are experiencing imprison· 
ment, exile or other fonns of political oppression as a result of their 
literary activities. 
Earlier this year, Du1ch PEN also conferre<l honorary membership 
on Pramoedya Ananta Toer. 
ALI MURTOPO WARNS JOURNALISTS 
Indonesia's Information Minister, Generai Ali Murtopo, bas warned 
jnumalisti not to set up a trade union. Speaking in Jakarta on 
13 'May, he said that this would disturb relationships in the press 
world and would create conflicting groups of employees and em· 
ployers. And that, he said, is Marxism. 
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East Timor up·date 
BRITISH AMNESTY CALI.S FOR SPECIAL ACTION 
An urgent call for immediate action to secure 1cspect for Amnesty 
principles in East Timor was made at the Annual General Meeting of 
the British Section of Amnesty lntc.rnational in July thls year. 
The resolution which received overwhelming support from the 
AGM Icads as follows: 
ThisAGM strongly urges the International Secretariat to ~ek 
farther information regarding alleged widespread atrocities and 
human rights violations committed in East Timor since Indon-
esian troops invaded the country in l 975 . This AGM urges the 
International Secretariat to take steps at the earliest possible 
moment to secure respect for Amnesty principle! in East Timor. 
This AGM further requites the International Secretariat to in· 
vestigate the pOMibiJlty of adopting Eut Timor under the 
country-action dossier scheme. 
The country-action dossier scheme is a scheme as yet in an experi· 
mental stage which is being applied to countries where the risk c f 
retaliation against individual prisoners if adopted is great or where 
the information regarding human rights violations and atrocities 
which are known to be being committed is difficult ·t-0 corroborate 
by independent sources. The scheme is currently being applied to 
Ethopia and Uganda. 
lt l'I belic\>cd that this resolution will now be raised at the forth· 
coming A.I. rnternational Council meeting in September thls yenr. 
---...,..~-· --
Literature 
Indonesia. the Prison State 
A t 6·page pamphlet with photographs. 
Indonesia, Unions Behind Bais 
A 16-page pamphlet an the detention of Trade 
Unionists and the suppression of Trade Unions. 
TAPOL posters {2 designs) 
T APOL badges 
A tapol 's song on cassette 
Treatment of Indonesian Political Prisoners . 
Forced Labour and Transmigration 
lOp each 
lOp ea.;:h 
50p each 
!Op each 
£1.00 each 
A 25-page report, fully annotated, giving the history and 
facts on forced laboUJ abu~e of political prisoners. 
Published by TAPOL in February 1978. Price: £ l 
Postage 
\Vhen ·pla.cing orders for literature, please add 
following amoun1s for postage : 
25% of orde1 (minimum 7p) for UK and Europe; 
75% of order (airmail) or 25% of order (seamail} 
for overseas. 
TA POL campaigns for the release of Indonesian 
political prisoners and is a humanitarian organ-
1 • 
isation. It is not associated with any political 
groups, either in Indonesia or abroad, and is 
supported by individuals and organisations of 
many shades of opinion. 
SUHARTO VISITS EAST TIMOR 
Jn a visit designed to convince the world that Indonesia is in con1rol 
of the country, Prestdent Suharto went to East Timor on l 6-17 July, 
the second anniversary of its fo1ced integnition into Indonesia. 
On the first day, Suharto announced the opening of a television 
station in Dill, the capital, and also went to a small gathering of boy 
3couts, but no public rally was held. While in Dill. he addressed 
East Tbnor's Indonesian-sponsored Regional People's Assembly 
(DPRD), and said that "the urgent matter is the regtoration of 
peace and order." The Indone&.ian-appointed governor of East 
Ti:mor, Arnaldo Araujo, put in more bluntly: "Funds supplied by 
the Indonesian government cannot all yet be used for development 
because we face not only questions of material development but we 
must still convince a small segment of people who are being misled. 
Efforts continue to bring them back to the right palh. If they still 
refuse to listen, the only way will be for us to crush all those who 
stand in the way of integration." 
On July 17, Suharto was said to have spoken before a large rally 
in Maliana, a town close to the Indonesian border. The Maliana area 
has been under Indonesian control since its troops launched the initial 
botdcr invasion of East Timor in early October 1975. According to 
n report from Australia.journalists were barred from going to 
Maliana for the Suharto visit. 
Interestingly enough, Guilherme Goncalves, the chairman of the 
aforementioned Regional People's Assembly, shed some ~ton 
Suharto's choice of Dili and Maliana as the only two places he 
visited in East Timor. ln a July 8 interview with Tempo, Concalves 
was asked if East Timor was ready to participate in Indonesfan's 
forthcoming Five-Year Plan. He replied that "there must be rccoo-
ciliaticn and tranquill!y among the 'people rust." At present, Gon-
calves continued, upeople can still only work in places where our 
army has a concentration of forces, such as Dili, Same or Maliana." 
Change of Address 
Please a<Jdress all correspondence and enquiries to: 
TAPOL 
8a Treport Stieet, 
London SW18 2BP 
Change of Banlc Account 
T APOL's Bank Account has also been changed: 
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